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Abstract 
 
This paper provides the first empirical examination of the microstructure of the euro money market, 
using tick data from brokers located in 6 countries. Special emphasis is put on the institutional 
environment (monetary policy decisions and their implementation, payment systems and private 
market structures) and its implications for intraday volatility, quoting activity, trading volume and bid-
ask spreads in the overnight deposit segment. Volatility and spreads increase right after ECB monetary 
policy decisions, but market expectations of the interest rate changes were relatively precise during the 
sample period. Main refinancing operations with the open market are associated with active liquidity 
re-allocation, little volatility and no signs of market power or adverse selection. Spreads and volatility 
were high at the end of the reserve maintenance periods and during the year 2000 changeover. Even 
intraday, overnight rate levels hardly differ across euro area countries, reflecting active arbitrage and a 
high degree of integration. 
 
 
JEL CODES: G14, E43, E52, D44 
 
KEYWORDS: euro, financial market microstructure, high-frequency data, liquidity, money market, 
monetary policy instruments, overnight deposit rates, payment systems, reserve requirements, trading 
volume, transaction costs, volatility 
 
  
This paper provides the first broad empirical examination of the microstructure of the euro money market, in 
particular its overnight segment, the interbank market for short-term funds. Apart from generally presenting 
a perspective on this new market, the main point of the paper is to show how the institutional environment of 
it, which is described extensively in the paper, heavily influences its microstructure features. This 
institutional environment is composed of 1) the central banks’ interest-setting bodies and their long-term 
macro-monetary policy strategy, 2) the instruments for the implementation of monetary policy and for 
liquidity management, 3) the private market instruments and trading mechanisms for funds, and 4) the 
payment and settlement infrastructure for the transfer of those funds. All four elements can significantly 
influence the intraday behaviour of money market rates, trading volumes and bid-ask spreads. Second, the 
paper seeks to describe and explain the main features characterising euro overnight interbank deposit 
trading. Finally, we deliberately take a euro-area wide, cross-country perspective instead of focusing only on 
a single country’s money market and thereby provide information on the degree of integration in the 
overnight segment.  
Another novel feature is the data we collected for the 5 months between November 1999 and March 2000. 
The “heart” of this data set is a continuous (tick-by-tick) record of the quotes for overnight deposits posted 
on Reuters by 6 money market “voice” brokers from 4 euro area countries and the UK, plus a continuous 
record of all the quotes posted in the Italian electronic brokerage market MID (Market for Interbank 
Deposits). These market data are complemented by details about ECB Governing Council meetings, ECB 
data releases, Eurosystem monetary policy operations and information about important payment system 
events.  
The general intraday microstructure analysis shows “two-hump” or “u”-shaped patterns for quoting 
frequency and somewhat less pronounced for volatility (analogous, for example, to equity and bond 
markets), but a flatter, sometimes rather weakly (single) “hump”-shaped intraday pattern for bid-ask spreads. 
High spreads over midday may reflect the lower liquidity of the market around the lunch break (in particular 
when coupled with low turnover) and on certain days the arrival of new information.  
Moving to the first element of the institutional environment, euro overnight market quoting activity, rate 
volatility and spreads are relatively high on days with ECB Governing Council meetings (usually 
Thursdays), particularly during midday when the ECB’s interest rate decisions are released. These features 
reflect the arrival of important new information for the market associated with monetary policy decisions. 
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Non-technical summary However, there is no evidence that trading volume dries up before the releases, which is consistent with the 
absence of asymmetric information and adverse selection. In fact, rate expectations by the market were 
relatively precise over our sample period, with the absolute expectation error in the overnight rate before 
monetary policy decisions averaging only about 5 basis points (compared to the usual 25 and 50 basis point 
step size in monetary policy decisions). We also found that releases of M3 figures, which relate to the first 
pillar of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy, are preceded by a moderate increase in short-term volatility. 
But a very short slump in quoting activity in the half-hour before is not accompanied by a similar slump in 
trading volume, suggesting only a moderate degree of uncertainty. 
Passing to the second component of the money market’s institutional environment, Tuesday’s Eurosystem 
main refinancing operations are associated with high MID overnight trading volumes, particularly right after 
the announcement of the allotment results. The latter reflects the post-operation liquidity re-allocation 
process, which however seems to cause some moderate volatility only for a very short period after the 
announcement. Since in addition bid-ask spreads were not particularly high, neither before nor after the 
announcements of the tender results, one may conclude that the overnight market functioned fairly 
efficiently (without signs of adverse selection or market power) around Eurosystem open market operations. 
It is also shown that spreads and volatility tend to be very high at the end of the maintenance period for 
Eurosystem minimum reserve requirements, reflecting the high risks involved for banks when staying too 
long above or below their reserve targets.  
Turning to payment systems, we found that settlement days of Eurosystem main refinancing operations are 
characterised by very large market turnovers (at least for the Italian electronic trading system MID). 
However, the market seems to transact them with ease and without any increases in trading costs or 
volatility. We also argue that some institutional changes related to Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
led to a balancing of activity between morning and afternoon trading in the Italian overnight segment. 
Moreover, payment system disturbances seem to have been extremely rare and benign, so that we could not 
detect any strong signs of difficulty in the overnight market related to special events identified for the two 
largest euro area payment systems, TARGET and Euro1.  
Finally, we also document in the paper that the Y2K changeover led temporarily to very high volatility and 
very large bid-ask spreads in the euro overnight market, although the MID did not experience substantial 
volume reductions during this relatively risky week. 
Perhaps with the exception of some episodes at the time of the Y2K changeover and despite heterogeneities 
in the private trading environment, overnight rate differentials between euro area countries seem extremely 
small, even intraday, reflecting the very high degree of integration accomplished in this market only shortly 
after the introduction of the euro and the unifying forces of the single monetary policy. 
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This paper presents the first broad empirical examination of the euro money market’s microstructure, 
especially its overnight deposit segment. The introduction of the euro in 1999 provides a unique experience: 
the unification of 10 monetary policies into one results in the unification of 10 money markets into a single 
one. More than two years after the introduction of the euro, it appears interesting to study the state of the 
market, in particular its microeconomic functioning and integration. 
 
In contrast to other financial markets, such as bond, equity or foreign exchange markets, there is only a small 
literature touching upon microstructure issues of the money market. In particular papers addressing intraday 
features of this market are extremely rare. To our knowledge only Angelini (2000; for the Italian electronic 
deposit market before the introduction of the euro) and Furfine (1999, for the US fed funds market) have 
presented empirical papers on the intraday behaviour of money markets. Angelini focuses on the 
implications risk aversion has on Italian banks’ intraday timing of overnight transactions when periods of 
uncertainty about liquidity needs are determined by institutional features of the payment system. Furfine 
describes the size, concentration and intraday timing of the fed funds market and analyses bank relationship 
patterns in it with special consideration of institutions’ sizes. Most other empirical papers on money markets 
follow a traditional macroeconomic approach or look at the time series properties of short rates at a daily (or 
longer) frequency (see e.g. Spindt and Hoffmeister, 1988; Griffiths and Winters, 1995, and Hamilton, 1996, 
for the US fed funds market and Perez-Quiros and Rodriguez, 2000, as well as Bindseil and Seitz, 2001, 
who recently started such work for the euro overnight market). 
 
Some theoretical work by Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) and Bhattacharya and Fulghieri (1994) has 
explained the existence of private interbank markets for short-term funds with the need by banks to “re-
insure” against idiosyncratic liquidity shocks coming from their retail depositors. More recent theoretical 
work has addressed the issue whether this type of liquidity insurance causes systemic risk in the banking 
system (see De Bandt and Hartmann, 2000, for a survey). Finally, Freixas and Holthausen (2001) started to 
study the working of international money markets, when information about foreign banks is asymmetric. 
This theoretical interbank market literature in general does not tackle the role of regular monetary policy, 
central bank operations and regulations in money markets. 
 
However, there is an earlier literature that relates the behaviour of overnight interbank market rates by a 
representative bank to monetary policy operational procedures and money market accounting conventions, 
notably Ho and Saunders (1985), Campbell (1987) and Spindt and Hoffmeister (1988). More recently, 
Bartolini et al. (1998) introduce a role for central bank liquidity provision. Perez-Quiros and Rodriguez 
(2000) analyse the behaviour of a representative bank during the minimum reserve maintenance period when 
there is a symmetric pair of standing facilities. 
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The present paper has several objectives that distinguish it from the few previous studies. First, it aims at 
showing that the microstructure of the money market is heavily influenced by an institutional environment 
that can be decomposed in the central banks’ monetary policy decision-making bodies and their policy 
strategy; its operational procedures and instruments, such as the central bank open market operations serving 
as the main bank refinancing mechanism; the private market trading structures and procedures, such as 
“voice” brokers or electronic trading systems; and the payment (and settlement) infrastructure, particularly 
the structure and timing of large-value payment systems. Second, it seeks to describe and explain the main 
features characterising euro overnight interbank deposit trading, by studying the intra-week and intraday 
behaviour of bid-ask spreads, volatility, quoting frequency and – to the extent that it is available – trading 
volume observed in the market. Special emphasis is given to the intraday behaviour around key events, such 
as monetary policy decisions, M3 releases by the European Central Bank (ECB) and main refinancing 
operations (MROs) as well as large liquidity shocks, important settlement days and disturbances in euro area 
large-value payment systems. Third, we deliberately take a euro-area wide, cross-country perspective instead 
of focusing only on a single country’s money market. In order to enhance our understanding about market 
integration and market heterogeneity, we report the results for brokers located in different countries 
separately. 
 
To achieve these objectives we have collected two sets of data for the period of November 1999 to March 
2000. The first set comprises information about the character and timing of ECB monetary policy decisions 
and operations, data releases and payment system events. The second set comprises real-time, tick-by-tick 
Reuters price data from 6 “voice” brokers in four euro area countries and one non-euro area country as well 
as from the Italian electronic brokering system MID. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section gives a broad description of the 
institutional environment of the money market, covering the four aspects enumerated above. Section 3 
presents the data set collected for the purposes of this study. Section 4 describes and discusses the behaviour 
of quoting (tick) frequency, trading volume (where available), mid-rate volatility and bid-ask spreads, both 
across the trading week and the trading day, as well as around key money market events. The type of events 
considered include ECB interest rate decisions, releases of data on monetary aggregates, ECB Monthly 
Bulletin releases, Eurosystem open market operations, ECB releases of market liquidity information, the end 
of the maintenance period for the calculation of banks’ minimum reserve requirements, especially large 
liquidity shocks from Treasury operations, payment system closing times, regular settlement dates of open 
market operations, special events and disturbances in payment systems and the year 2000 (Y2K) 
changeover. Section 5 concludes. 
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The institutional environment of the money market can be decomposed in four elements: 1) the central bank 
bodies deciding on macro monetary policy and their general policy strategy; 2) the operational framework 
for the implementation of the monetary policy and liquidity management by the central bank (monetary 
policy instruments, such as open market operations, standing facilities, reserve requirements, etc.); 3) the 
private trading environment, including the different financial instruments traded (deposits, repos, 
derivatives, etc.), the trading facilities (electronic brokering, electronic information systems, etc.) and the 
market organisation (organised exchange vs. over-the-counter market); 4) the payment and settlement 
infrastructure (large-value payment systems, securities settlement systems, clearing and netting facilities, 
etc.).  
 
The money market is special insofar as the central bank sets the short-term interest rate and acts as the only 
ultimate provider of liquidity in a given currency, thereby dominating the supply side. The former is done 
through its policy strategy and the latter through its operational framework, which can be used to either 
inject or withdraw liquidity from the banking sector. Apart from directly refinancing from the central bank, 
money market participants trade with each other to take positions in relation to their short-term interest rate 
expectations, to finance their securities trading portfolios (bonds, shares, etc.), to hedge their more long-term 
positions with more short-term contracts and to square individual liquidity imbalances resulting from 
customer transactions or unsuccessful efforts in central bank refinancing operations. Funds (or securities in 
the case of secured markets) are ultimately transferred between the central bank and money market 
participants and among the participants themselves through payment (or settlement) systems. Depending on 
the financial instrument traded and the respective payment (or settlement) system used, the payment flows 
are not generally instantaneous, potentially happening on a day after the related trades, and have certain 
patterns during the day. In fact, all the four elements of the institutional environment of the money market 
can and do influence the evolution of prices and quantities in the money market. Therefore, the present 
section describes these four institutional elements for the euro money market, starting with a short 
introduction on the institutional framework for macroeconomic monetary policy decisions.  
 
2.1 The Eurosystem and monetary policy decisions for the euro area 
 
The Eurosystem, composed of the ECB and the 12 central banks of the countries that joined the third stage 
of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), conducts the monetary policy of the euro area.
1 Its goal is to 
maintain price stability in the euro area, defined as an annual increase of the harmonised consumer price 
index (HICP) of the euro area by less than 2%. The monetary policy strategy of the Eurosystem has two 
9 ECB • Working Paper No 80 • October 2001pillars: the first pillar assigns a prominent role to money, as reflected by the announcement of a quantitative 
reference value for the growth of the M3 monetary aggregate (at the time of writing and during the sample 
period considered below a 4.5% growth rate). The second pillar is a broadly based assessment of the outlook 
for future price developments, considering a large list of economic indicators.
2 The Governing Council of 
the ECB is the main policy making entity of the system. It is composed of the 6 ECB Executive Board 
members and the 12 governors of the national central banks (NCBs). Council meetings are held every two 
weeks (usually) on Thursdays. Whereas the main decisions – in particular on interest rates – are taken by the 
Council, monetary policy is implemented by the Board in a decentralised fashion via the NCBs. 
 
Interest rate decisions by the Council are first communicated to the market by a communiqué released at 
1.45pm (unless noted otherwise, all times referred to in this paper are Central European Times) on a day of 
the Council meetings on the ECB website and to all the major newswire services. Every other Council 
meeting is followed by a press conference at 2.30pm, in which the ECB President makes an introductory 
statement summarising the meeting and answers questions by the press. The introductory statement by the 
President and a transcript of the questions and answers is made available to the public shortly after the press 
conference. Table 1 summarises the three ECB interest rate changes during the sample period we are using 
below. In two out of three cases rate changes have been decided during Council meetings followed by a 
press conference. However, on 16 March 2000 rates were changed for the first time at a Council meeting 
without press conference.  
 


















4 Nov 99  12 Nov 99  1.50  2.50  3.50  2.00  3.00  4.00 
3 Feb 00  8 Feb 00  2.00  3.00  4.00  2.25  3.25  4.25 
16 Mar 00  21 Mar 00  2.25  3.25  4.25  2.50  3.50  4.50 
Note: MRO=main refinancing operation 
Source: ECB 
 
The ECB publishes data related to its monetary policy strategy. Towards the end of each month new figures 
on M3 (referring to the preceding month) are released at a given day around 10am, which the market can 
                                                                                                                                                                               
1 Greece joined the euro area on 1 January 2001. However, the empirical analysis below relates to data when the EMU was still 
composed by 11 countries. 
2 See Angeloni, Gaspar and Tristani (1999) and ECB (1999a) for in-depth discussions of the ECB monetary policy strategy. 
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3 Moreover, the ECB publishes a Monthly Bulletin with 
a host of macroeconomic data and monetary analysis, including information on the second pillar of its 
monetary policy strategy. During the sample period considered in this paper, the Bulletin was usually 
released on the ECB website on the Thursday of the second week of each month at 7pm.
4 
 
2.2 The Eurosystem’s framework for monetary policy operations 
 
The operational framework for monetary policy can be defined as the set of instruments and procedures that 
a central bank uses to implement its monetary policy by managing the liquidity situation in the money 
market and steering money market interest rates. Following a fairly standard taxonomy, we will classify the 
instruments used by the Eurosystem as open market operations (addressed in 2.2.1 below), standing facilities 
(2.2.2) and reserve requirements (2.2.3).
5 Open market operations are the general instruments used to 
manage the liquidity situation and to steer interest rates. Among them, and as suggested by their name, the 
main refinancing operations (MROs) are entrusted with the task of providing the bulk of liquidity to the 
banking system, raising their role to the key operational monetary policy instrument. (During our sample 
period the amounts allotted in MROs varied between EUR 50 and 100 billion; see also Figure 3 below.) 
Additional liquidity is placed through the longer-term refinancing operations. These are operations 
conducted regularly by means of monthly tenders for reverse transactions with a maturity of three months. 
However, as a rule the Eurosystem will not use this instrument to signal monetary policy intentions to the 
market and conducts them as variable rate tenders (with a multiple rate procedure and pre-announced 
intended allotment volumes). The Eurosystem may also carry out fine-tuning operations on an ad hoc basis 
to smooth interest rate movements. During our sample period only one fine-tuning operation in the form of a 
collection of fixed-term deposits was conducted on 5 January 2000, with the aim to absorb some excess 
liquidity in the aftermath of the millennium date change. Finally, the Eurosystem may conduct also 
structural operations to modify its net liquidity position vis-à-vis the banking system over a longer period. 
So far, the Eurosystem has not conducted any structural operations. In this paper we will focus on the main 
refinancing open market operations. 
 
2.2.1 Main refinancing operations 
In the light of their prominent role, it may be useful to examine in some greater detail the MROs. These 
operations are conducted in the form of weekly tenders for repurchase agreements (repos) with a maturity of 
                                                       
3 During the sample period used in the empirical analysis the ECB did not formally pre-announce the release dates of new M3 data, 
although it was known in the market that they would occur around the 20
th of a month. It follows that the market was somewhat 
uncertain about the exact day of the release. As of July 2001, the ECB announces M3 publication dates in advance. 
4 The Monthly Bulletin is now normally released on Thursday morning at 10am. 
5 A comprehensive description of the Eurosystem’s operational framework is given in ECB (2000c). The following contains an 
extensively abridged overview over ECB operations. An analysis of the operational framework of the Eurosystem in the context of 
the ECB’s monetary policy strategy is presented in Manna, Pill and Quirós (2001). Escrivá and Fagan (1996), Borio (1997) and 
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6 For reasons of effective policy signalling to the market, the auction has been conducted as a 
fixed (single) rate tender during our sample period.
7 In this tender procedure the ECB determined the overall 
quantity to be allotted on the basis of its own assessment of the liquidity needed by the banking system, 
including an internal liquidity forecast.
8 This quantity was divided pro rata among all bidders against eligible 
collateral through credits on their reserve accounts.
9 If it perceives that there are inflationary pressures the 
ECB can, in theory, choose to allocate less liquidity to the open market, either by reducing the total amount 
allocated or by raising the MRO rate. However, the main policy tool used by the Governing Council is the 
MRO rate. Allotment decisions are taken by the Executive Board of the ECB on an operational level.  
 
Figure 1: ECB information about the money market liquidity situation on Reuters page “ECB40” – 
the example of 8 February 2000 detailing the situation on 7 February 
 
08:09 08FEB00  EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, FRANKFURT a.M.  GE66608  ECB40 
Current account holdings of counterparties with the Eurosystem 
Including holdings to fulfil reserve requirements. In million of euro. 
 
As at 07/02/2000 
(Maintenance period: 24/01/2000 to 23/02/2000) 
 
Current  account  holdings  (*)         109,057 
Estimated  reserve  requirements  (**)        107,500 
Average current account holdings in current maintenance period (*)    108,689 
 
Use of the standing facilities of the Eurosystem: 
Use  of  marginal  lending  facility          11 
Use  of  deposit  facility           61 
 
(*) Including minimum reserve holdings. For historical data see ECB41. 
(**) Preliminary estimate of reserve requirements for the current MP 
Note: The time stamp at the upper left-hand corner of each page reprinted here refers to Greenwich Mean Time, so that one hour 
needs to be added for Central European Time. 
Source: ECB, Reuters 
 
                                                                                                                                                                               
Blenck (2000) offer broad descriptions and comparisons of major central banks’ operational frameworks for monetary policy and 
liquidity management. 
6 Repos are financial instruments for the temporary exchange of cash against securities with a transfer of ownership. The operations 
can also be conducted in the form of collateralised loans in which the ownership of securities is not transferred. The specific form 
used should not have any impact on the economic results of the operation. 
7 On 8 June 2000 the Governing Council of the ECB decided to switch from the fixed-rate tender regime to a variable-rate tender 
regime for MROs (ECB, 2000b). Since then MROs have been conducted as multiple-rate (“American”) auction, i.e. bidders are 
served going down from the highest rates bid to the lowest onesat the rates they effectively bid in the auction until the quantity to be 
allotted is exhausted. The timetable, the allotment decision and the announcement of the results are the same as in the fixed-rate 
tender procedure. The main policy rate is now a pre-announced minimum bid rate. The main reason for the change in tender 
procedure by the Eurosystem was the worsening over-bidding occurring in the fixed-rate tenders. In this paper we will restrict 
ourselves to the functioning of the market under the fixed-rate regime that characterised the first one and a half years of stage 3 of 
EMU. 
8 Whereas the internal forecast was not published under the fixed-rate regime for MROs, the Eurosystem is now indicating the 
expected liquidity needs of the banking system in the announcements of the variable-rate auctions. 
9 There are two tiers of eligible collateral. Tier 1 consists of marketable debt instruments, which are relevant for the entire euro zone. 
Tier 2 includes both marketable and non-marketable assets (including equities), which are of particular importance for the respective 
national financial markets and banking systems. No distinction is made between the two tiers with regard to their eligibility for the 
various types of Eurosystem monetary policy operations. 
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9.15am at the latest - it publishedon Reuters page ECB40 the aggregate reserve account holdings of the 
banking sector with the Eurosystem on the previous day, its average reserve account holdings since the start 
of the minimum reserve maintenance period and its aggregate recourse to the standing facilities. As pointed 
out by Vergara (2000), ECB40 is an important daily input for money market traders in general, and many 
market participants use the information on the liquidity situation of the overnight market for the 
determination of their bids before the 9.30am main-refinancing auction cut-off time. Figure 1 gives an 
example of this page. In addition, once a week – (usually) on Tuesday at 3pm – the ECB releases the weekly 
balance sheet of the Eurosystem, referring to the stock figures of the preceding Friday. 
 
The weekly MROs are usually (but not always) held on Tuesdays. The rate applied in the MROs is 
determined by the latest Governing Council decision on the MRO rate, i.e. at the latest at the last Thursday 
before the next auction. The timing of the auction itself is the following: 
 
(i) On Monday around 3.30pm, the day before, the ECB announces the operation and its conditions on 
Reuters and other wire services. The announcement contains a reconfirmation of the rate and some standard 
MRO properties, such as the type of operation, the maturity, the timing for bids and the minimum bid size 
(see the top of Figure 2 for an example of the relevant Reuters page ECB16). Normally, these MRO 
announcements do not contain news for the market; 
 
(ii) Banks can submit bids to their respective NCB until 9:30am on Tuesday, the day of the auction, which 
are then transferred to the ECB for the derivation of allotments. So, the information provided on page 
ECB40 at 9:15am at the latest can be used to fine-tune the bids; 
 
(iii) At around 11:15am on Tuesday the result of the auction is announced again on Reuters (page ECB17 or 
ECB18). As shown at the bottom of Figure 2, the allotment announcement includes, inter alia, the total 
number of bidders (equivalent to the number of bids in fixed rate tenders), the total amount bid, the total 
amount allotted and the so-called allotment ratio (the ratio between the amount allotted and the amount bid). 
In contrast to the auction announcement described under (i) above, the allotment announcement does contain 
information for the market, particularly the overall quantities bid and allotted. 
 
Figure 3 plots the total amounts allotted against the total amounts bid for the 20 MROs between 1 November 
1999 and 23 March 2000. The figure indicates that the amounts bid were weakly increasing in the total 
amount allotted and, in any case, much larger than the allotments. This is a reflection of the so-called 
overbidding behaviour. As the auctions were carried out in the form of fixed rate tenders during the sample 
period and since the four months coincided with expectations of rising interest rates, demand usually 
exceeded supply and liquidity was allocated according to the pro-rata rule. Anticipating such rationing, 
13 ECB • Working Paper No 80 • October 2001banks tended to “overbid”, i.e. to demand more than they actually needed. The overbidding behaviour is thus 
at least partly the realisation of self-fulfilling expectations, whereas for each bank - to the extent that the 
amount bid by the others and the total amount allotted are uncertain - the rationing rate is random ex ante.
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Figure 2: ECB auction information on Reuters pages “ECB16” and “ECB17” – the example of the 
main refinancing operation on 8 February 2000 
 
14:43 07FEB00  EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, FRANKFURT a.M.  GE66608  ECB16 
Main Refinancing Operation – Announcement 
Reference number: 20000009         Min Allotment: 
Transaction Type: Reverse Transactions    Fixed Rate: 3.25 % 
Operation Type: Liquidity Providing      Min Bid Amount: 1.00 mn 
Procedure: Standard Tender        Max Bid Limit: 
Start Date: 09/02/2000 
Maturity Date: 23/02/2000 
Duration (days): 14 
Auction Type: Fixed Rate Tender 
Allotment Method: Single Rate 
 
10:18 08FEB00  EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, FRANKFURT a.M.  GE66608  ECB17 
Main Refinancing Operation – Allotment 
Reference Number: 20000009        Min Allotment: 
Transaction Type: Reverse Transactions    Fixed Rate: 3.25 % 
Operation Type: Liquidity Providing      Max Bid Limit: 
Procedure: Standard Tender         
Tender Date: 08/02/2000         % of Allot.: 6.37 
Start Date: 09/02/2000          Tot Amount Allotted: 66000.00 mn 
Maturity Date: 32/02/2000 
Duration (days): 14          Tot Bid Amount: 1036647.80 mn 
        Tot  Number  of  Bidders:  686 
Auction Type: Fixed Rate Tender 
Allotment Method: Single Rate 
Note: The time stamp at the upper left-hand corner of each page reprinted here refers to Greenwich Mean Time, so that one hour 
needs to be added for Central European Time. 
Source: ECB, Reuters 
 
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Figure 3 also shows (with dates) the last MROs before ECB rate increases. It appears that before these 
policy moves bids tended to be high, but not necessarily the quantities allotted. This observation is 
consistent with the market having correctly anticipated the rate increases and attempted to get as much 
“cheap” refinancing as possible before the rate rises (see also sub-section 4.2.1 below). The “smallest” bid 
amount was received on the 11
th of January, the first refinancing operation after the century date change 
(also indicated with a date in Figure 3).  
 
                                                       
10 See Bindseil and Mercier (1999) for a general discussion of the bidding behaviour in Eurosystem fixed rate auctions and Nautz 
and Oechsler (1999), Ayuso and Repullo (2000), Breitung and Nautz (2000) and Ehrhart (2000) for critical analyses of the over-
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One function of the standing facilities is to provide or absorb liquidity with an overnight maturity when 
unforeseen liquidity shocks occur. Therefore they provide a type of insurance mechanism for banks, but at 
penalty interest rates. The initiative in these transactions is on the side of the counterparty. Notably, a 
Eurosystem counterparty may use the marginal lending facility to obtain (against eligible collateral) 
overnight liquidity in case of an individual shortage, whereas it may use the deposit facility to make deposits 
in case of individual excess liquidity. If a counterparty ends the day with an overdraft position on its 
TARGET account with a NCB (see 2.4 below), then the intra-day credit is automatically transformed into an 
overnight loan via a recourse to the marginal lending facility. The fact that the access to the standing 
facilities on a given day is not subject to rationing (provided adequate collateral is posted in the case of 
recourse to the marginal lending facility) makes the corresponding interest rates effectively bound the 
overnight market interest rate, creating a “corridor”. Therefore another function of the two standing facilities 
is to contribute steering interbank market rates in case of larger aggregate liquidity imbalances. For example, 
towards the end of the reserve maintenance period (see 2.2.3 below) or in extreme market situations like the 
Y2K changeover week (see 4.5 below) such imbalances may temporarily occur. 
 
2.2.3 Minimum reserve requirements 
The third component of the operational framework of the Eurosystem that influences the market 
microstructure are the reserve requirements. They aim at (i) stabilising money market interest rates without 
recourse to frequent central bank open market operations, and (ii) creating or enlarging the structural 
liquidity shortage of the banking sector to increase the effectiveness of monetary policy actions (ECB, 
2000c). According to the current regime, all credit institutions established in the euro area have to keep 2% 
of the total amount of overnight deposits, other deposits with maturity below 2 years, debt securities with 
maturity below 2 years and money market paper held by institutions and individuals not subject to the 
Eurosystem reserve requirement system (i.e. excluding interbank liabilities) at reserve accounts with 
national central banks. These reserves are remunerated at the daily average of MRO rates (over the 
respective reserve maintenance period). Reserve requirements have to be fulfilled on average over a one-
month maintenance period (“averaging”) that runs from the 24th of a month to the 23rd of the following 
month.  
 
The amount of reserves required and held is significant, in the order of EUR 100-110 billion during the 
period considered. So they provide a buffer against unexpected liquidity shocks, mitigating the related 
fluctuations of market rates. However, the stabilising effect of the averagingprovision, which requires banks 
to anticipate potential liquidity shocks and plan the holding of liquid funds carefully, becomes weaker and 
eventually vanishes towards the end of the reserve maintenance period, when banks are no longer in a 
                                                                                                                                                                               
bidding phenomenon. 
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overnight rates in the euro area between November 1999 and March 2000 displayed in Figure 4 further 
below. At or shortly before the 23
rd of each month euro overnight rates either exhibit a short trough (excess 
liquidity compared to the required reserves) or a short peak (shortage of liquidity). On the basis of daily 
data, Perez-Quiros and Rodriguez (2000) argue that the introduction of a “symmetric” pair of standing 
facilities by the Eurosystem (see 2.2.2 above) has effectively led to a reduction of this volatility and also to a 
more symmetric distribution of it. (Figure 4 below illustrates the relatively balanced occurrence of troughs 
and peaks around the five end-of-maintenance period episodes during our sample period.) 
 
2.3 The private market trading environment 
 
In a broad sense, the money market is delimited as the market for short-term funds, usually with maturity up 
to one year. In this paper we focus on the overnight interbank deposit market, which is of particular interest 
to the liquidity management of the central bank. With an estimated (minimum) daily turnover of EUR 61 
billion in the second quarter of 1999 it is by far the largest spot segment of the money market in the euro 
area. (This figure is taken from an ECB Market Operations Committee Survey covering Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, which is summarised in Santillán et al., 2000, annex 2, 
table 1.) Other segments of the money market include (i) unsecured deposit contracts “tomorrow next” 
(overnight contracts for the following day until the next day), and with 1-week, 2-week, 1-month, 3-month, 
6-month and 1-year maturity, (ii) repurchase agreements (“repos”, reverse transactions secured by securities) 
also ranging from overnight to 1 year, (iii) short-term forward (up to 1 year) interest rate agreements and 
(exchange-traded) futures, (iv) foreign currency swaps at the same maturities as for unsecured deposits and 
repos, and (v) interest rate swaps ranging from 1 week to 1-year maturity, (vi) bank certificates of deposits, 
(vii) commercial paper and (viii) Treasury bills (short-term government debt securities and options). 
According to the 1999 ECB survey, unsecured overnight deposit trading exceeded trading in any of the other 
segments by a factor of at least 4 and for most of the segments by much more (Santillán et al., 2000, annex 
2, table 1). A more recent ECB survey detailing data for the second quarter of 2000 shows that deposit 
trading up to 1 week maturity has partly caught up in size (ECB, 2001, pp. 9f.).  
 
The relative importance of the different contracts can vary substantially between countries in the euro area. 
For example, whereas during our sample period there were active repo markets in Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy and Spain, they were hardly developed in other euro area countries. The leading euro futures 
contract, the 3-month EURIBOR, is mainly traded on the London International Financial Futures and 
Options Exchange (LIFFE), even outside the euro area. However, the strong growth of the overnight 
segment since the start of stage 3 of EMU, particularly for cross-border transactions, seems to have been 
relatively uniform across countries in the euro area. This reflects in part the interbank market’s role in 
reallocating liquidity after Eurosystem MROs in the case that some banks received a larger allotment than 
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could occur under the fixed-rate tender regime because of individual banks’ uncertainty about the ECB’s 
total allotments and other banks’ bid sizes.) It also reflects the effective functioning of short-term interest 
rate arbitrage and liquidity equalisation across the euro area (also in the case of asymmetric liquidity 
shocks). Regarding trading hours, which seem to be rather homogenous since the introduction of the euro 
across the area, the overnight deposit market opens at around 8 in the morning and closes at around 17.45 in 
the afternoon. (This schedule is closely related to that of TARGET explained below.) 
 
Most of the contracts enumerated above are traded over-the-counter, in contrast to the futures for example, 
that are traded on the derivative exchanges in various European financial centres. As for other financial 
markets, such as foreign exchange markets or bond markets, trading can be bilateral over the phone or 
through electronic market communication facilities (such as Reuters) or through “voice” brokers matching 
counterparties or even through electronic brokering systems. Again the relative importance of the different 
market trading facilities can be very different from country to country, from trader to trader and even for a 
given trader over time. Also, government securities and commercial paper tend to be traded separately from 
interbank deposits.  
 
Focusing again on the unsecured euro deposit market, at one extreme of the trading infrastructure is certainly 
the Italian electronic broker market MID (Market for Interbank Deposits, run by e-MID S.p.A., Milan). In 
February 2000 MID had 182 Italian member banks and 7 foreign member banks, participating in trading 
with very different degrees of involvement. In this system, which covers virtually the entire existing 
domestic overnight deposit market in Italy, transactions between members are clinched automatically, when 
the respective rates (offered or bid) and quantities match, provided that credit limits are not exhausted. (The 
repo market happens outside this system though.) However, as in the case of other euro area countries, 
cross-border trades by Italian banks are still mostly executed via “voice” brokers in the target countries or 
through direct bilateral transactions. In Spain, most of overnight deposit (and short-term repo) trading is 
executed via 4 main “voice” brokers. By definition, brokers generally do not trade on their own account, but 
collect desired trading prices and quantities from some customers to match them with other customers 
against a fee. Many money market brokers (in Spain or elsewhere) also post indicative bid and ask prices on 
electronic market information systems, such as Reuters, Bloomberg or Telerate. Most of the remaining 
transactions in Spain (in particular for maturities beyond 1 month) are undertaken bilaterally through 
electronic market dealing systems. After some consolidation in the last years, there remain less than a dozen 
of main dealers driving money market trading in Spain.  
 
In France brokers are also used, but the bulk of the transactions takes place over the phone. France is known 
to have a very active overnight market and the most developed repo market with relatively narrow traded 
bid-ask spreads. In fact, the Banque de France (1999, p. 54f.) underlines the role of the French euro money 
17 ECB • Working Paper No 80 • October 2001market as a hub in distributing liquidity within the euro area. It reports figures showing that 40% of the 
turnover by the large players asked for their rates to calculate EONIA (the standardised daily euro overnight 
reference rate) had at least one French bank on one side of the transaction.
11 In Germany interbank deposit 
trading is dominated by the 4 large German commercial banks and the semi-public Landesbanken. However, 
most of these main players tend to have a euro-area wide approach rather than focusing on domestic trading. 
The larger part of transactions tends to be undertaken directly between traders (over the phone) and only a 
smaller part through “voice” brokers. The Deutsche Bundesbank (2000, p. 23f.) also observes that Germany 
plays a key role in the distribution of liquidity between the euro area and the EU countries that did not join 
EMU in the first wave, notably the UK with its large international financial markets in London. (These 
countries have (limited) access to euro intraday liquidity through the Eurosystem’s TARGET payment 
system.
12) Finally, in the Netherlands the upper tier of players driving the deposit market is again composed 
of the 4 large Dutch commercial banks. The bulk of the trading is undertaken via bilateral communication, 
particularly through Reuters Dealing, and the rest through “voice” brokers, not only located in the 
Netherlands. The 4 large Dutch banks tend to do more than half of their business with counterparties located 
in another euro area country, whereas 2
nd tier institutions are much less active in this regard. Overnight 
deposit trading strategies between the main Dutch players tend to be fairly diverse. 
 
In sum, in spite of the important cross-border activity in the unsecured euro interbank deposit market, there 
remain heterogeneities in the private trading environment. However, these remaining heterogeneities, which 
mainly result from different traditions and market structures that prevailed before the introduction of the 
common currency, do not necessarily imply inefficiency or non-integration. On the contrary, Figure 4 below 
illustrates how close overnight rates of brokers located in different countries tend to be, except in extreme 
circumstances like the year 2000 (Y2K) changeover week. Some of the heterogeneities, such as electronic 
trading versus “voice” broker or telephone trading, do compete with each other, and only the future will 
show whether this competition will lead to more uniform trading structures in the euro money market or 
                                                       
11 EONIA stands for “euro overnight index average”, an index sponsored by a number of European banking and financial 
associations to measure the effective cost of unsecured overnight money for the euro area. It is calculated daily as a volume-
weighted average of unsecured euro overnight deposit contract rates, as reported by a representative panel of 49 large banks from 
euro area countries (41), other EU countries (4) and overseas (4 with important operations in the euro area), including the main 
market makers. The index is calculated each business day from all overnight transactions carried out by panel banks between the 
opening of trading in the euro interbank market and the closing of the respective RTGS system. It is published no later than the 
opening of the following business day. EURIBORs (Euro Interbank Offered Rates), various reference rates for term deposits (1 week 
to 1 year) also sponsored by those associations, are published at 11am each business day on the basis of panel banks’ contributions 
shortly before that time. They are based on simple averages of quoted offer rates only (corrected for the extremes). More information 
on EONIA and the EURIBORs is available from http://www.euribor.org. 
12 The current non-euro area EU countries (“pre-ins”) have a full connection to TARGET. According to the conditions for such a 
connection, the pre-in NCBs can acquire funds up to a certain aggregate limit on the basis of arrangements with private banks 
located in the euro area to offer intraday liquidity in euro to their domestic credit institutions (up to another maximum amount per 
bank). The collateral required to secure such external intraday overdrafts in euro has the same quality standards as the assets eligible 
in the euro area, but it can also be denominated in the respective home currency. The provision of intraday credit in domestic 
currency to a foreign country is by international standards a very special arrangement, as it is the first time a major central bank has 
allowed central banks belonging to other currency areas to provide settlement facilities in its own currency. See ECB (1998a) for 
further details. However, large internationally active banks from non-euro area EU countries that have branches or subsidiaries in the 
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wide electronic trading systems will emerge that attract the bulk of the transactions.
13 
 
2.4 Payment and settlement infrastructure 
 
Payment and settlement refer to the effective transfer of funds and securities in relation to all types of 
monetary and financial transactions to achieve “finality”. In particular, without efficient and safe large-value 
payment and securities settlement systems monetary and financial integration is virtually impossible to 
achieve, since interest rate or price differentials would occur, because of the impossibility or cost of 
transferring funds for arbitrage purposes. In particular, important short-term interest rate differentials in the 
euro money market would endanger the singleness of monetary policy, which is implemented through a 
single short-term interest rate for the entirety of the euro area. For this reason, among others, the Eurosystem 
has introduced TARGET at the start of stage 3 of EMU, the Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross 
settlement Express Transfer system, which is composed of the 15 domestic RTGS (real-time gross 
settlement) systems in the EU, a network of bilateral links (interlinking mechanism) between them and the 
ECB payment mechanism. 
 
Table 2: Main large-value payment systems in the euro area in 1999  
(daily averages, value of payments in EUR bn. / number of payments in ‘000) 
System 1
st quarter  2
nd quarter  3
rd quarter  4
th quarter 
TARGET       Total  964 / 155  906 / 158  884 / 163  947 / 176 
Domestic  615 / 130  554 / 130  530 / 133  562 / 144 
Cross-border  349 /  25  351 /  28  354 /  30  386 /  32 
Euro1  175 /  52  166 /  65  168 /  72  175 /  83 
EAF  172 /  48  147 /  45  141 /  46  143 /  48 
PNS  92 /  22  94 /  20  89 /  19  97 /  19 
Source: ECB (2000a) 
 
The private sector, more precisely the Euro Banking Association (EBA), has introduced a parallel area-wide 
net settlement system, Euro1 (a successor of the previous ECU clearing and settlement system). In addition, 
there exist two relatively important national hybrid systems (combining features of net and gross settlement), 
namely EAF (Euro Access Frankfurt) in Germany and PNS (Paris Net Settlement) in France.
14 Table 2 
exhibits the relative use of these systems during the first year of EMU. It turns out that TARGET and Euro1 
                                                                                                                                                                               
euro area would not need to go through their respective NCBs to receive intraday liquidity for euro payments. They could also 
benefit directly from their branches’ or subsidiaries’ access to TARGET intraday overdrafts. 
13 For an elaborate pre-EMU perspective on money market integration in Europe, also based on interest rate differentials, see 
Eijffinger and Lemmen (1995). 
14 Other purely national systems are of rather minor importance compared to the overall payment traffic in the euro area. 
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in terms of the value of transactions and Euro1 in terms of the number of transactions executed. This reflects 
the behaviour by market participants to use the “safer” RTGS system TARGET for larger cross-border 
transactions and the “cheaper” net settlement system Euro1 for smaller cross-border transactions. (The 
average transaction size in each system and period can be easily derived by dividing the average value of 
transactions (left figures) by the average number of transactions (right figures).) 
 
The functioning of this payments infrastructure can influence euro overnight deposit trading in various ways. 
First, trading in the money market can be adversely affected in case of technical problems in any of the 
major systems or by any of the participants in these systems. For example, if information about a computer 
problem in a large bank becomes known to the market, preventing it from making payments, trading might 
halt and bid-ask spreads increase.
15 We will therefore examine below whether the euro overnight market 
exhibited any special features on days when particular events or problems in either Euro1 or TARGET 
occurred. Second, current payment systems have procedures in place to close the system at the end of the 
day without any participant remaining with unsettled payment obligations. As well described by Angelini 
(2000) for the Italian net settlement system, the timing of these end-of-day procedures can generate certain 
intraday trading patterns. For example, only at the time of closing of the net settlement system (defined as 
the “cut-off time” for new payments) banks will know with certainty their final net balance to be settled. 
This can lead to increased and more aggressive trading behaviour, as reflected for example by intraday 
overnight rate volatility, immediately after the net system’s closing. Similarly, in an RTGS banks can have 
incentives to delay payments during the day in order to economise on liquidity and gain flexibility for 
securities trading. This can lead to enhanced trading before the closing of the RTGS system (see e.g. 
Deutsche Bundesbank, 2000, p. 23).
16 
 
In the euro area Euro1 is scheduled to close at 4pm (and similarly the two domestic systems EAF and PNS). 
This means that no new payments can be entered in the system. Any remaining open settlement obligations 
at this “cut-off time” have to be settled afterwards through TARGET, following a standard end-of-day 
settlement procedure that can sometimes take more than an hour. The real-time gross system TARGET 
closes at 6pm. In the empirical section we will examine whether enhanced money market activity or 
volatility can be identified during the European afternoon. Finally, we will also look for special effects on 
the settlement days of the Eurosystem’s large MROs, usually on Wednesdays. 
 
 
                                                       
15 See De Bandt and Hartmann (2000, sections 3.3 and 4.3) for a discussion of “systemic risk” in payment systems and a survey of 
the literature. 
16 At present none of the euro area large-value payment systems provides intraday information on balances of participating banks or 
information on queued payments. 
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In order to study in greater depth the microstructure features of the euro money market and their links to the 
institutional environment described above, we have collected for the months of November 1999 through 
March 2000 an intraday data set of overnight deposit rate quotes, details about ECB Governing Council 
meetings, ECB data releases, Eurosystem monetary policy operations and information about important 
payment system events. The present section briefly describes this dataset. 
 
3.1 Overnight interest rate quotes 
 
The “heart” of the data set is a continuous (tick-by-tick) record of the quotes for overnight deposits posted 
on Reuters by 6 money market “voice” brokers from 4 euro area countries and the UK, plus a continuous 
record of all the quotes posted in the Italian electronic brokerage market MID. The recording started with the 
beginning of trading on 3 November 1999 in the morning and it finished with the stop of trading in the early 
evening of 23 March 2000, altogether including 101 trading days. The “voice” brokers covered are C. 
Kliemm Gmbh (Frankfurt/Germany, denoted KLIEMMM), Geldhandels Gmbh (Frankfurt/Germany, 
denoted GEHA), Liberty Grel (Paris/France, denoted GREL), Prebon Yamane (Amsterdam/Netherlands, 
denoted PYWMEURO), Prebon Yamane (London/England, denoted PYEC), Corretaje e Información 
Monetaria y de Divisas (Madrid/Spain, denoted CIMV). All the 6 brokers are major players, at least within 
their own domestic market.
17  
 
For reasons of homogeneity with these “regular” broker data, we use mainly the quoted rates (“proposte”) in 
the Italian electronic broker system MID described in 2.3 above, occasionally extended by transactions 
volumes (from the “contratti” file). However, the MID quotes are still different from the quotes of the six 
“regular” brokers. In particular, since it registers all quotes by members on its screen, including many that 
are dominated by other quotes at a given point in time, whereas the “regular” brokers only post indicative 
pairs of bid and ask quotes from time to time on Reuters, the available MID quote data are much more 
frequent than the other available data. As a first step, we therefore eliminated all dominated quotes at any 
given point in time, thereby deriving the best bid and best ask rate prevailing at any point in time. This 
procedure also eliminates all domestic arbitrage possibilities for Italy and defines a “market spread” for the 
MID. We call the new series emerging from this procedure “MID-best”. Although regular “voice” brokers’ 
bid-ask quotes might also be regarded as approximations of market spreads, we will treat them separately 
from the MID-best data below, where necessary, since their still much lower frequency might imply more 
structural differences for which one might not be able to control.  
 
                                                       
17 The selection of brokers was determined by the accessibility of their pages through a general Reuters subscription. 
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comparable in terms of the frequency with which they post quotes on Reuters, except for the French GREL, 
which seems to be less active in updating its Reuters page, and the London-based PYEC, which seems to be 
more active. As indicated to us by market participants, the latter may be related to the very active use of the 
euro overnight market in London for the financing of trading portfolios. The former may be either related to 
this broker’s especially slow way to update its page or to a generally higher share of direct interbank money 
market trading compared to brokered trading in France. 
 
The MID-best ticks series shows how much larger quoting frequency is, when all rates in the market can be 
considered. In other words, the money market is not as “sleepy” as it looks from the Reuters broker pages. 
Average quoted bid-ask spreads seem to be of a similar order of magnitude across brokers (roughly 4 to 5 
basis points), except – again – for GREL (7 basis points) and the Spanish CIMV (10 basis points). The two 
“outliers” illustrate that there can be different conventions for quoted spreads between brokers or countries. 
Of course, when there is competition and arbitrage activity the implied overnight rate differences cannot be 
present in the traded rates. It is also instructive to observe that the MID spreads, derived from “best” quotes, 
are only slightly narrower than the spreads by GEHA, KLIEMMM, PYEC and PYWMEURO. In other 
words, although only indicative the rates by these four brokers must still be relatively close to competitively 
traded rates and they must also be relatively close to the actual market spread. 
 
Table 3: Summary statistics of broker overnight rate data, whole sample 
Broker  Total ticks  Average bid-ask spread  Mid-rate volatility 
GREL (FR)  144  7.0  2.8 
KLIEMMM (DE)  712  4.5  1.8 
GEHA (DE)  704  4.4  1.8 
CIMV (ES)  648  10.2  2.0 
PYWMEURO (NL)  530  4.9  2.4 
PYEC (UK)  1144  5.3  1.9 
MID-best (IT)  8510  3.7  2.3 
Note: The average bid-ask spread is the ask rate minus the bid rate for each quote, averaged over the whole sample. The mid-rate 
volatility is the standard deviation over all intraday period mid rates. 
Source: Reuters, e-MID, authors’ calculations 
 
Finally, intraday overnight rate volatility is of similar order of magnitude across countries/brokers but not 
entirely uniform. For example, the French data from GREL show the largest deviation from other brokers. 
Interestingly, the two German brokers (KLIEMMM and GEHA) quote identically volatile overnight rates, 
whereas the two Prebon Yamane brokers – located in two different countries, the Netherlands 
(PYWMEURO) and the UK (PYEC) – quote rates that show some differences in volatility. This observation 
indicates that some of the volatility differences between brokers might have a country component. For 
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high cross-country arbitrage in the euro overnight market, intraday liquidity in London can sometimes be 
higher than in one of the smaller euro area countries.
18 However, a word of caution regarding broker-to-
broker comparisons is also in order. As the case of bid-ask spreads illustrates, some of the differences might 
be related to broker-specific quoting conventions and traditions or technical reasons that are unlikely to be 
present in traded rates. Hence, particularly regarding CIMV, GREL and MID, one has to be somewhat 
cautious in making cross-country comparisons. 
 
From the raw series, which are irregularly spaced in time, we then derived regularly spaced intraday time 
series. Due to the relatively low tick frequency of the “voice” broker quotes, the intraday time period was 
chosen to be 3 hours. Hence, the day is decomposed in a “morning” interval (8am to 11am), a “midday” or 
“lunchtime” interval (11am to 2pm) and an “afternoon” interval (2pm to 5pm).
19 As already mentioned in 
2.2.3, Figure 4 shows a plot of the resulting 7 overnight mid-rate series during the sample period, where 
middle rate is defined as the average of the arithmetic means of bids and asks through the interval. 
 
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
A problem with the broker data (except the much cleaner MID data) is that, as mentioned above, these 
quotes are only indicative. Actual rate negotiations and transactions are more frequent than the ticks on 
Reuters.
20 This is particularly visible for the French broker, since in France the bulk of the negotiations are 
conducted directly over the phone. Yet we will operate under the assumption that this (imperfect) data, to the 
best of our knowledge the only intraday data publicly available, is informative. More precisely we will 
assume that (i) the more “active” the market is (in terms of turnover or price updating), the larger the 
number of quotes posted by the brokers, (ii) the more volatile the market is, the more volatile is the mid-rate 
derived from the bids and asks posted by the brokers, (iii) the larger the (potentially unobserved) effective 
spread, the larger the spread quoted by brokers.
21 
 
In order to test whether these assumptions make sense, we have examined some of them with the help of the 
more complete data from MID. For example, Figure 5 plots the intraday distribution of trading volume 
                                                       
18 However, we should also note that the volatility difference between the two Prebon Yamane brokers, while being large in 
November, December and January, became small in February and vanished in March, the end of our sample period. Therefore, the 
phenomenon might have been only temporary. 
19 For a higher intraday frequency, such as hourly or half-hourly, there would have been too many empty intervals for several 
brokers. 
20 This statement does not apply directly to the electronic MID system. Interestingly, the number of ticks according to the MID-best 
series is roughly similar to the number of transactions actually clinched in our sample. This can be explained by the fact that a 
transaction usually changes the best bid or ask rate, thereby creating a tick (by construction of the MID-best series). However, total 
MID quotes are again more frequent than MID-best quotes. 
21 Owing to the institutional aspects described in the first part of the paper, turnover in the overnight market is not generally subject 
to extreme events, such as days when it completely dries up. In market segments characterised by less smooth patterns, the 
23 ECB • Working Paper No 80 • October 2001(from the “contratti” series) and quoting frequency (from the “proposte” series) in that system during our 
sample period (excluding the special last two business days of the maintenance period and the 
Christmas/New-Year week). The proportionality between the two variables is evident, except maybe for the 
first trading hour when, apparently, quotes change frequently without transactions. The correlation between 
the two series across a representative day is actually 73%.
22 So this little test supports the assumption that 
intraday periods with high quoting frequency will normally also have high market activity in terms of 
turnover.  
 
[FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
However, in addition to the special first hour of trading we discovered another case for which the link 
between turnovers and ticks was weakened. During the afternoon of end-of-maintenance period days there is 
a significant increase in the number of ticks with only a small increase in trading volume, so that for these 
days the correlation between the two decreases to 55% (Figure 6). In other words, enhanced quoting 
frequency in the euro overnight market may at certain special times measure higher market activity in terms 
of price updating without much increase in trading volume. One explanation for this phenomenon may be 
special times of high uncertainty or high rates of information arrival, when quoted rates may be updated 
frequently but traders may be very cautious in acquiring inventories (see also 4.4.1 below). Alternatively, as 
some market participants pointed out to us, in certain times of stress in the market – when all staff is 
focusing on the trading – the Reuters “voice” broker pages may not be regularly updated any more.
23 
 
[FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
3.2 Eurosystem monetary policy decisions, operations and data releases 
 
From internal ECB sources we established a “calendar” of monetary policy decisions, operations and data 
releases. The “calendar” describes the 11 Governing Council meetings during our sample period, including 
the 3 ECB interest rate changes displayed in Table 1, the 5 meetings with a subsequent press conference and 
the timing of the regular post-Council press communiqué. It also details the timing of 5 M3 and Monthly 
Bulletin releases. For the 19 MROs covered it contains the information provided on ECB Reuters pages (see 
                                                                                                                                                                               
functional link between tick frequency and volume may however be more complicated and the corresponding correlation may even 
change sign on occasions. We are grateful to an anonymous referees to bringing this point to our attention. 
22 To gather additional evidence, we calculated also the correlation between the hourly MID volumes and the voice brokers quoting 
frequency. The correlation turned out to be equal to 84% on “normal days” and 61% on EOM days. 
23 Quoting (tick) frequency as a proxy for trading activity has also been used in other financial markets. See for example Hartmann 
(1998, 1999), who found strong relationships between daily and monthly spot foreign exchange market trading volumes by dealers 
or “voice” brokers and tick frequency on Reuters. We also tested how closely volatility in quoted overnight rates (“ordini” file) is 
aligned with volatility in traded rates (“contratti” file) in the MID. We found a similarly close relationship as for ticks and volumes. 
However, the intraday period with the weakest link between the two was not the opening hour but the closing hour between 5pm and 
6pm. 
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the last and penultimate day of each of the 5 reserve maintenance periods covered as well as the occurrence 
of large liquidity shocks from Treasury operations. 
 
3.3 Payment system information 
 
As described in 2.4 above, the two most important large-value payment systems in the euro area, TARGET 
and Euro1, are scheduled to close at 6pm and 4pm respectively, i.e. during or after our 3-hour “afternoon” 
period of each trading day. For Euro1 we have collected the effective completion times of the end-of-day 
settlement procedure. Since it is the EBA Clearing Company’s policy to encourage early completion about 
half an hour after closing time, much later completion could indicate an unforeseen event or sometimes even 
a financial disruption. (If a net system participant faces difficulties to settle, this tends to show up ultimately 
at closing/settlement time.). The median time for completing the Euro1 settlement procedure during the 
sample period was 4.36pm (average effective completion time 4.39pm). On 19 days (out of 101) Euro 1 
settlement was completed after 4.45pm. Although on none of these 19 days completion seems to have been 
as late as causing an emergency in the system, it is still interesting to examine our data with a view on 
whether any of these late completions coincided with any signs of disruption in the interbank market.  
 
TARGET opening (7am) and closing times (6pm) seem to be very regular. During November and March 
only one noticeable incident occurred in TARGET, caused by the breakdown of a major euro area bank’s 
system connecting it with its national RTGS system. At this occasion TARGET stayed open until 6.30pm 
and the related national RTGS even remained open until 7.30pm, to give the bank’s counterparties the 
occasion to resolve their liquidity problems induced by the incident. (Euro 1 also stayed open until 5.02pm 
on that day.) We therefore had a separate look at money market trading on this day. 
 
As pointed out to us by various commentators, settlement days of Eurosystem main refinancing operations 
may also be special, due to the large liquidity and collateral needs for settling the repos. We therefore also 
collected the dates of the 20 settlement days during our sample period.  
 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
We can now turn to the main empirical analysis of the euro overnight markets’ functioning. We do this by 
studying the quoting frequency (and to the extent that it is available also the trading volume), overnight rate 
volatility and bid-ask spreads from our broker data. We first draw a general picture of the market across the 
week and across the days of the week (sub-section 4.1). We then relate in greater detail specific intraday 
patterns to the institutional framework of the money market. We chronologically discuss the effects of 
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policy implementation (sub-section 4.3) and of payment system events (sub-section 4.4). Finally, we also 
study the behaviour of ticks (MID volumes), volatility and spreads during the critical week of the Y2K 
changeover (sub-section 4.5). 
 
4.1 Regular intra-week and intraday patterns 
 
In this sub-section we discuss the intra-week and intraday patterns of our data set and make a first brief 
attempt to relate any regularities discovered to the institutional environment of the money market 
microstructure, as described in section 2. We focus here on “normal” days, which from now on we define as 
all business days in our sample excluding the two last business days of each reserve maintenance period and 
the days of the Y2K changeover week (25 December 1999 until 3 January 2000). What usually happens at 
the end of the reserve maintenance period and what happened during the Y2K changeover is addressed in 
greater depth in sub-sections 4.3.3 and 4.5. Tables 4, 5 and 6 show for each weekday and for each of our 
three intraday intervals the average quoting frequency (plus the average trading volume for the Italian MID), 
the average volatility and the average bid-ask spreads between November 1999 and March 2000.  
 
Quoting frequency is measured as the number of ticks per period averaged over the relevant sub-periods of 
the entire sample (Table 4). Volatility is measured as the average absolute overnight rate change during an 
intraday period, calculated from middle rates (Table 5).
24 Occasionally, we will also look at the intra-period 
tick-to-tick standard deviation, a more high-frequency volatility measure, which we add to the tables in 
square brackets. Finally, spreads are measured as arithmetic averages of the differences between ask and bid 
overnight rates per relevant sub-period (Table 6).  
 
Starting with the day-of-the-week patterns, quoting activity is the highest on Tuesdays and Thursdays for all 
brokers and countries except the MID in Italy in which quoting is also intense on Fridays (Table 4).
25 The 
lowest tick frequency occurs after the weekend on Monday (except in the MID). However, daily trading 
volumes in the MID are not always proportional to daily ticks. Surprisingly, the highest trading volumes 
occur on Wednesdays in this trading system (about EUR 25 billion), in particular during the afternoon 
before the closing of payment systems, and the lowest volumes on Thursdays. Less surprising are perhaps 
the high MID volumes on Tuesdays (about EUR 21 billion).  
 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
                                                       
24 For the purpose of calculating this volatility measure, synthetic mid rates have been derived by linear interpolation between the 
latest quote before the respective interval threshold and the next quote after the interval threshold. Since this procedure ensures 
uniform time intervals, distortions of volatility measures resulting from differences in quoting frequencies between brokers should 
be minimised. 
25 The German broker KLIEMMM is also an exception regarding Thursdays, but not Tuesdays. 
 
26 ECB • Working Paper No 80 • October 2001 
The most volatile day (for “voice” brokers) is Thursday, with an average 3-hourly absolute overnight rate 
change of 4 to 7 basis points (Table 5). Monday tends to be the least volatile, although not for all “voice” 
brokers and although the differences to other days can be relatively small. If one looks at the mean 3-hourly 
rate changes of about 3 to 4 basis points for all our “normal” days, then it appears also that the euro 
overnight market is in general not a very volatile market. Differences between bid-ask spreads across the 
trading week are not particularly pronounced (Table 6). Having said that, the largest spreads are observed on 
the very active and volatile Thursdays (probably related to inventory risk) and the lowest on the inactive and 
stable Mondays (potentially related to low activity).  
 
Overall, different days of the week stand out for different microstructure features. Mondays stand out with 
low post-weekend trading and volatility, Tuesdays with high market activity potentially related to MROs 
(see 4.3.1 below), Wednesdays with very large MID trading volumes potentially related to MRO settlement 
obligations (see 4.4.2), Thursdays with high volatility (and higher spreads) potentially related to ECB 
Governing Council Meetings (see 4.2.1). Other features seem more blurred and it appears worthwhile to 
rather turn the attention to intraday variations. 
 
Looking at Table 4, we find evidence of the “two-hump” (or “u”) shaped intraday activity pattern.
26 In our 
sample, the ”u”-shaped pattern holds for ticks for all weekdays except Thursday, the special Council day, 
and for all brokers.
27 The exception of high midday activity on Thursdays will be explained below by the 
timing of the release of ECB interest rate decisions on that day. The pattern also holds for MID trading 
volumes, except in the case of the special Tuesday midday period during which MRO allotment results are 
released. The general “u”-shape is a pattern that is already well established in the literature on intraday 
market behaviour in stock, foreign exchange and bond markets (see e.g. Wood, McInish and Ord, 1985; 
Dacorogna et al., 1993; Fleming, 1997). Market activity tends to be more intense early in the morning and 
towards the end of the business day, while it is relatively slow at midday. The standard argument is that 
early in the morning the market reacts to news accumulated overnight.
28 As will be discussed in greater 
depth in 4.4, the closing of payment systems late afternoon/early evening and related liquidity needs 
stimulate trading in the afternoon (see e.g. Angelini, 2000). Finally, in countries where traders have lunch 
breaks activityslows down over midday.  
 
                                                       
26 We do not make the distinction between “two-hump” and “u”-shaped intraday patterns in this paper. However, a closer 
examination of our MID data seems to indicate that ticks and volumes are rather “two-hump” shaped (Figure 5) and volatility and 
spreads rather “u”-shaped. 
27 In the Spanish case (CIMV) several exceptions occurred, potentially related to later lunch time in this country. 
28 The observation for the MID in Figure 5 that during the first hour of the day quotes change frequently without too much 
transaction volume, which picks up strongly only in the second hour, suggests that traders test the market first with unacceptable 
quotes, often implying large spreads, or with very small quantities associated to quotes. 
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regular and pronounced than for quoting frequency (Table 5).
29 Moreover, intraday volatility seems also to 
be high on Tuesday mornings and sometimes on Monday and Friday evenings. These volatility patterns are 
consistent with the MRO auctions early on Tuesday and with interest rate decisions on Thursday around 
lunchtime, which regularly transmit important information to the market, resulting in larger movements in 
the quotes.
30 Both phenomena are addressed in greater detail below. Friday evening volatility might be the 
consequence of liquidity managers’ attempts to square undesired positions before the weekend. As discussed 
for example by Hong and Wang (2000), market participants are reluctant to hold open positions during long 
no-trading intervals, such as weekends. Consequently, traders will tend to square their positions when the 
weekend approaches. 
 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Unlike overnight market activity and volatility and unlike the experience of bond or equity markets, quoted 
overnight rate spreads in the euro money market do not seem to exhibit a clear “u”-shaped intraday pattern 
(Table 6). First, differences across the trading day appear often rather small. Second, for the “voice” brokers 
often even a (weakly) reversed, single “hump” shaped intraday pattern emerges. This is consistent with an 
order processing cost/liquidity component in spreads, since when the market is more (less) active and liquid 
spreads should be lower (higher).
31 However, there are also other intraday spread patterns in our sample. It 
is, for example, noteworthy that in the MID spreads are systematically higher during the morning compared 
to the other two periods of the day, which are more or less flat. Given that market activity was not found to 
be particularly low during the morning period, this might have to do with the arrival of new information, but 
it is not so clear why this new information does not affect spreads in other countries.
32 An alternative 
explanation is that MID quotes can be directly “attacked” by money market traders, so that – compared to 
often more indicative “voice” broker quotes – there are stronger incentives for banks to protect themselves 
against becoming a counterparty in a trade early in the morning when uncertainty is still high and liquidity 
still low. In any case, a more detailed analysis (not reported in the table) showed that this phenomenon 
resulted entirely from extremely high spreads during the market opening hour between 8am and 9am, i.e. 
before the ECB release of information on the market’s liquidity situation on Reuters ECB40. 
 
                                                       
29 The most visible exceptions are the Dutch broker, the special Thursday midday period and for several “voice” brokers the 
Monday. However, as we will see in 4.2.1 below, if we distinguish Governing Council Thursdays from non-Governing Council 
Thursdays, then the “u” volatility shape will re-emerge for the latter. 
30 We found the enhanced Thursday midday volatility to be robust to the elimination of the three pure policy rate changes by the 
ECB (see Table 1). 
31 Since the euro money market trivially is larger than the money market of any single member country before EMU, one may have 
expected it to exhibit higher liquidity and narrower spreads. Some early evidence provided by Detken and Hartmann (2000, Table 2) 
and by spread estimations undertaken by the Banca d’Italia and reported in Santillán et al. (2000, Annex 3) are consistent with the 
fulfilment of this expectation.  
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However, in contrast to some signs of pre-closing volatility, as discussed above, in our data overnight 
spreads are not systematically higher during the last trading interval on Friday. In other words, somewhat 
surprisingly our quoted spreads do not indicate a reluctance of liquidity managers to incur new positions 
before the weekend. 
 
4.2 Monetary policy news and events 
 
In order to furtherrefine the picture of the euro overnight market’s microstructure, we now turn the attention 
in greater detail to a selection of major monetary policy news and events. We first examine the intraday 
patterns of Governing Council Thursdays, as compared to non-Governing Council Thursdays. Second, we 
study the market patterns of morning periods with the release of new M3 data (referring to the first pillar of 
the ECB’s monetary policy strategy) and compare them to non-M3 release mornings. Finally, we briefly 
comment on ECB Monthly Bulletin releases. 
 
4.2.1 Governing Council meetings and interest rate decisions 
Normally, Thursday is the day of Governing Council meetings and therefore of interest rate announcements. 
However, the preceding analysis still ignored the fact that only every other week there is a Council meeting 
and a few of them were actually held on a Wednesday. Therefore, we report in Table 7 ticks (and MID 
volumes), volatility and spreads for Council days and non-Council Thursdays separately.
33 For all except 1 
of our 7 brokers and virtually all of our 3 standardised intraday periods quoting activity is higher on Council 
days (and usually largely so) than on non-Council Thursdays, which turn out to be relatively inactive days, 
roughly comparable to Mondays (see Table 4). Whereas for the MID the “classical” “u”-shaped quoting 
pattern re-emerges for non-Council days, the picture for the “voice” brokers is less clear on these days 
(potentially related to their inactive nature). For Council days a typical “u” intraday quoting pattern does not 
emerge, because of the 13.45 ECB communiqué about interest rate decisions. The midday period, during 
which the press release on monetary policy decisions is issued, is also very active compared to other midday 
periods more generally, but Council mornings are not necessarily special in this regard (see Table 4). MID 
trading volumes, also reported in Table 7, show “u”-shaped transaction patterns for both Council days and 
non-Council Thursdays. Finally, the indication from Table 4 that Council days are not characterised by 
particularly high MID trading volumes, in spite of interest rate decisions, is confirmed. MID volumes are 
only moderately higher on Council days, mainly due to slightly enhanced post-decision afternoon trading. 
                                                                                                                                                                               
32 The high morning spreads are unlikely to be a consequence of uncertainties related to the settlement of foreign exchange contracts. 
As pointed out by Angelini (2000), the settlement of these spot FX contracts in the morning is known to banks two days in advance. 
33 In our sample, 4 and 18 November, 2 and 15 December 1999, 5 and 20 January, 3 and 17 February, and, finally, 2 and 16 March 
2000 were Council days. We eliminated the 20 January meeting from our comparison, since it coincided with the end of the reserve 
maintenance period. The 15 December and 5 January Council meetings were held on Wednesdays. 
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In order to get an even clearer picture of the market across the Council days, we provide a further refinement 
of Council and non-Council Thursdays, using 45 minute time intervals for the MID (Table 8). These figures 
show how trading activity (volume and quoting) exhibits a noticeable increase right after the 13.45 
communiqué, as the market “digests” the news from Council decisions and agents re-balance positions. On 
non-Council Thursdays (and most other normal days) volumes decrease by almost half and quoting stays 
constant between the same two intraday periods, because of the lunch break. The average volume during the 
post-announcement period on Council days is 2.5 times larger than on non-Council Thursdays and tick 
frequency 4.5 times larger. (Nevertheless, this interval is not the period with the largest MID volume on 
Governing Council days, which occurs during the subsequent 45 minutes.) Large trading volumes after 
announcements are also observed in equity markets, as illustrated for example in the case of the Paris Bourse 
by Gajewski (1999). MID turnover stays somewhat higher across most of the afternoon when compared with 
non-Council Thursdays, but not when compared with other weekdays.  
 
However, in the intervals directly before the 13.45 interest rate announcement, turnover is not particularly 
low. It is at about the same level as (or slightly higher than) average volume for non-Council Thursdays. 
This provides relatively solid first evidence that during our sample period upcoming interest rate decisions 
by the ECB Governing Council were not preceded by substantial asymmetric information, which would 
have led to adverse selection and hence ceasing volumes. The relationship between asymmetric information, 
adverse selection and reduced trading volume has been illustrated forcefully by Milgrom and Stokey (1982). 
This observation seems also consistent with the hypothesis that market participants were relatively confident 
in having anticipated the interest rate decisions correctly. However, the fact that our sample period falls into 
a cycle of rising policy rates may also help explain part of the robust trading volumes before the 
announcements. In such a situation it may pay for traders that give a non-zero probability to an interest rate 
increase by the central bank to “frontload” and borrow liquidity before the announcement. 
 
[TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Turning to volatility, non-Council Thursdays show a “clean” “u”-shaped intraday pattern, which is reversed 
on Council days, when the 13.45 monetary policy release causes high volatility during the midday period 
(Table 7). (GREL and MID show a declining volatility pattern due to high pre-announcement volatility and 
generally high early morning volatility for the MID.) The finer MID data in Table 8 show that most of the 
45-minute volatility is concentrated in the interval right after the press release. For our standard volatility 
measure we found an average 4.6 basis point absolute change in overnight rates, which is about 3 times 
larger than the mean 45-minute rate change over a Council day and 10 times larger than the average change 
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(reported in square brackets) are qualitatively similar although somewhat more moderate. For most of the 
other intraday periods average volatility on Council days is only very moderately above the volatility on 
non-Council Thursdays but not above the corresponding volatility for an average of all normal non-Council 
weekdays. This suggests that the market absorbs the new information from interest rate announcements 
relatively fast and efficiently.  
 
A closer examination of the pre- and post-announcement market rates in the MID led us to the conclusion 
that the volatility right after the press release was not a mechanical effect of the three rate changes during 
our sample period.
34 It rather seems to come from the interplay between pre-announcement overnight market 
expectations and the information conveyed by the announcement. Interestingly, an inspection of overnight 
rate levels quoted in the MID during the hours before and after the announcements led us to the observation 
that the market was better in anticipating unchanged policy rates than in anticipating changes in policy rates 
during our sample period. In other words, when the ECB left rates unchanged overnight market rates were 
not much different or only slightly above the current policy rate right before the announcement. However, 
on the days of the three interest rate increases overnight rates – despite having increased by more than half 
of the subsequent policy change well before the announcement – were only in the case of the 16 March 2000 
consistently very close to the future rate. These effects of expectations on the overnight rate can also be seen 
well from the behaviour of the broker rates before changes in the MRO rate in Figure 4 above. Therefore, 
the relatively large volatility (compared to other intraday intervals) measured during the 13.45 to 14.30 
period reflected the adjustments resulting from the remaining differences between expectations and actual 
decisions. However, a 4.6 basis points amplitude of 45-minute post-announcement variations, although large 
for the standards of the overnight market, is not very large economically, in particular when one compares it 
to the size of policy rate changes in Table 1 (25 to 50 basis points). One way to read this result is that on 
average the absolute difference between market expectations and actual interest rate decisions has been 
relatively small during our sample period. 
 
As regards the evidence for bid-ask spreads, Council Thursdays seem to be characterised by slightly wider 
spreads than non-Council Thursdays, in particular over the midday interval when the expected arrival of new 
information in the form of the interest rate decision release gives incentives for dealers to avoid getting into 
transactions and volatility increases inventory holding costs (Table 7). Neglecting the last 15 minutes of the 
midday period, the “voice” broker data could suggest that quoted spreads may be high before ECB Council 
interest rate decision releases, potentially providing evidence in favour of some asymmetric information 
before ECB monetary policy announcements. However, this observation is not consistent with the evidence 
in Tables 7 and 8, showing relatively high market activity and trading volume during the Thursday midday 
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Mucklow and Ready (1993) find a significant increase in the bid-ask spread and decrease in depth before 
announcements. 
 
The higher frequency MID data in Table 8 show particularly large average spreads (about 5 basis points) 
during the very active 45-minute interval following the interest rate press releases and, compared to non-
Council days, also somewhat enhanced spreads during the interval thereafter. In all likelihood they reflect 
the high inventory costs associated with the high volatility during the same periods reported above, since 
volume seems abundant and the uncertainty has already been resolved. Whereas the MID spreads before the 
announcement seem also somewhat higher than those on the inactive non-Council Thursdays, the same does 
not hold true for a comparison with other non-Council (non-MRO) weekdays (and similarly so for the late 
Council afternoon). Hence, overall we feel that the evidence on volumes, volatility and spreads considered 
here is not suggestive of strong asymmetric information and adverse selection directly before ECB interest 
rate decisions. This observation would be consistent with the conclusion that overnight market participants 
were not subject to very large uncertainty in relation to ECB interest rate decisions, for example since they 
could by and large anticipate the outcome of Council meetings, as already concluded from the discussion on 
volumes and volatility above (and also indicated by the MRO bidding behaviour described in sub-section 
2.2.1, Figure 3). It is also in line with the recent results by Gaspar et al. (2001), who do not find evidence of 
important market misperceptions or large and significant volatility increases on Council days for daily data. 
 
4.2.2 M3 releases 
Another major news release in relation to the monetary policy stance of the ECB is the publication of euro 
area M3 data once a month around 10 in the morning. Table 9 compares ticks, volatility and spreads for M3 
release mornings with the same variables for non-release mornings of all other “normal” days (i.e. excluding 
end-of-maintenance period days and Y2K changeover days).
35 It indicates increased quoting activity and 
perhaps slightly increased spreads, but volume is rather low (or comparable to normal days, as displayed in 
Table 4 for example). Our standard measure of volatility (mean absolute rate change) also looks rather low 
compared to non-M3 release days. However, when using the more short-term volatility measure (the mean 
tick-to-tick standard deviation over the morning interval, indicated in square brackets in Table 9), then this 
reverses and it turns out that on M3 release mornings high-frequency volatility is slightly above the one on 
other days (excluding special event days). 
 
[TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
                                                                                                                                                                               
34 We did this by comparing the volatility of the market rate in Table 7 with the volatility of the difference between the market rate 
and the MRO rate. We also undertook a visual inspection of all the rates quoted around any single interest rate announcement. 
35 There were four M3 data releases during our sample: 29 November and 28 December 1999, 28 January and 25 February 2000. 
Because of the special factors playing a role on Y2K changeover days, we eliminated the December release from our comparison. 
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Table 10 further refines the picture for the Italian MID data, using 30-minute intervals during mornings. The 
first notable feature is that quoting almost ceased during the half-hour before the 3 releases, dragging also 
volatility and spreads on low levels during that time, although in line with the “voice” broker data it is rather 
high before and after this special interval. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, due to a limited number of large 
transactions during this interval, MID trading volume is not particularly low during this half-hour compared 
to before and after. Generally, volume is lower than on other days though, but this phenomenon seems to be 
spread out over the whole M3 release morning. This analysis also confirms that high-frequency volatility is 
somewhat higher than on non-release days, particularly early in the morning before the release and 
somewhat less after the release. Accordingly, spreads also go up during certain intervals before and after the 
releases. 
 
[TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Because of the low number of M3 releases that all happened on either a Monday or a Friday these patterns 
have to be interpreted with an extra dose of caution. With this caveat in mind the results at hand suggest that 
the market is paying attention to M3 releases (special behaviour of ticks and volatility), contradicting some 
ECB “watchers” who believe that the first pillar of the monetary policy strategy of the ECB is of little 
practical relevance for actual policy-making and the market, and that there may be a modest degree of 
uncertainty about the effective M3 figures to be released before the announcement. However, trading 
volumes before the announcement are not consistent with the notion of a slowing market due to asymmetric 
information about the M3 numbers and related adverse selection. Finally, in contrast to interest rate 
decisions no post-announcement increase of volume can be detected in our sample, although for certain 
post-announcement intervals volatility and bid-ask spreads appear slightly higher than for the same time 
intervals on non-announcement days. 
 
4.2.3 Publication of the ECB Monthly Bulletin 
Another important publication of the ECB is its Monthly Bulletin, which usually comes out in the second 
week of the month.
36 Although many of the data displayed in it have already been released before, so that 
they can be known by market participants in advance, the Editorial of it regularly highlights some policy 
messages and the possibility cannot be excluded ex ante that the interpretation of the data is occasionally 
different from that by market participants. Since the Bulletin usually comes out on a Thursday between two 
Council meetings, these messages could be news to the overnight market. However, when comparing pre-
Monthly Bulletin release Thursday afternoons with non-Monthly Bulletin release afternoons post-Monthly 
Bulletin Friday mornings with non-release Friday mornings we could not identify any special patterns in the 
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Bulletin was only published at 7pm, i.e. outside regular money market trading hours. Another could be that 
the market takes a longer period of time to digest the large amount of information contained in the Bulletin. 
Alternatively, it could mean that the Monthly Bulletin does usually not convey important new information to 
money market liquidity managers, indeed. We decided to save space and not display the related tables here. 
 
4.3 Monetary operations and liquidity management 
 
We now extend the analysis of the euro overnight market microstructure to the effects of the operational 
implementation of monetary policy and the related money market liquidity management by the ECB. We 
first consider the weekly main refinancing operations (MROs) by the Eurosystem, we then briefly study the 
daily release of money market liquidity information by the ECB, subsequently we look at the special days at 
the end of the reserve maintenance period and finally we examine the effects of special liquidity shocks 
resulting from operations related to national Treasuries, when the respective NCBs act as a banker for the 
government. 
 
4.3.1 Main refinancing operations 
The weekly MRO (usually) takes place on Tuesdays.
37 Let us first look at our three standard intraday 
intervals, as displayed in Tables 4, 5 and 6 again. On Tuesday midday (the period from 11am to 2pm), right 
after the announcement of the auction results at 11.15am, the market is very active compared to other 
midday intervals during the week (Table 4). For example, Tuesday lunchtime MID turnover is the highest 
for all midday periods during the week (on average 6.2 bn euro). Tuesday lunchtime tick frequency is the 
second highest, only after the special (Council) Thursdays discussed above. This reflects banks’ activities to 
reallocate liquidity according to their effective needs, since first smaller banks that have not bid in the 
auction themselves may borrow overnight money from larger banks and second even some of the bidding 
banks may sometimes receive more or less than the quantities optimal for them (because the total amounts 
bid by other banks is uncertain for each bidding bank under the fixed-rate tender regime).  
 
However, high Tuesday market activity is not only limited to the post-auction midday period. “Voice” 
broker quoting frequency and MID trading volume tend also to be high during the on-going auction process 
on Tuesday morning (8am to 11am period). This is consistent with the hypotheses that at least some banks 
“speculate” or hedge on the basis of their expectations what the auction outcome is going to be and that the 
                                                                                                                                                                               
36 Monthly Bulletin release days during our sample were 11 November and 9 December 1999, 13 January, 10 February and 9 March 
2000. 
37 Almost every Tuesday during our sample period there was an MRO. The exceptions were 9 November 1999 and 7 March 2000, 
when the MRO was held a day earlier (on Mondays), as well as 28 December 1999, when it was held two days later (on a Thursday). 
We eliminated the operations of 30 December 1999 (Y2K changeover day) and of 23 November and 21 December 1999, 22 
February and 22 March 2000 (end of reserve maintenance period) from the general analysis of MROs. 
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3 above) contains new information for the market. The later afternoon period (from 2pm to 5pm) is also 
relatively active in terms of MID turnover compared to other afternoons during the week. This could 
indicate that the post-auction reallocation process is carrying on for most of the afternoon. 
 
Is this high market activity around Eurosystem main refinancing open market operations associated with less 
desirable features, such as high volatility or wide bid-ask spreads? As can be seen from Table 5 auction 
Tuesdays are not particularly volatile days in general, even for the post-auction liquidity re-allocation 
period. Similarly, bid-ask spreads seem to be relatively close to those of non-MRO auction days during the 
week (Table 6). All this evidence would suggest that the overnight market functions relatively normally and 
efficiently before, during and after the MROs, irrespective of the high volumes that have to be moved.  
 
In order to further clarify the picture, we look again at the MID data alone for a higher frequency (45 minute 
intervals), comparing MRO days with (“normal”) non-MRO days (an average of “normal” Mondays, 
Wednesdays, non-Council Thursdays and Fridays; Table 11). Perhaps the most visible information from this 
additional comparison is the almost doubling of MID turnover and tick frequency in the interval right after 
the announcement of the auction results of 11.15am compared to the 45 minutes before. Volume and ticks 
are also 2 to 3 times larger than on non-MRO days at the same time, further substantiating the post-auction 
liquidity re-allocation hypothesis mentioned above. Actually, MID volume is also somewhat higher than on 
non-MRO auction days for most of the other intraday periods (but not MID best ticks). For example trading 
volume is also particularly high (but not ticks) during the interval around the 9.15am ECB release of 
liquidity information from the previous day. In other words, as already conjectured above from the “voice” 
broker results the market seems to trade already early in the morning, based on the information this release 
provides in relation to the likely auction outcome two hours later. However, despite the generally enhanced 
trading activity on MRO days, volatility is only somewhat higher for the two 45-minute intervals 
immediately following the auction announcements and bid-ask spreads even not for those, confirming the 
qualitative results from the “voice” brokers. 
 
[TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE] 
 
As indicated before, the financial market literature has identified patterns of quasi-market breakdowns 
before important uncertainty-loaded events, such as auctions or news announcements, and a picking up of 
activity afterwards. These patterns could be related to several market imperfections: (i) they could reflect 
large information asymmetries before the auctions or news announcements; (ii) they could also arise if the 
liquidity allocation in an auction was inefficient and resulted in giving market power to the banks which 
were successful in the auction. The evidence about high tick frequencies and volumes before MROs clearly 
argue against (i). In relation to bid-ask spreads one would expect under the first scenario (i) that they would 
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auctions. Since MID or “voice” broker bid-ask spreads are neither particularly high before the auctions nor 
after the auctions, the available evidence seems to suggest that despite substantial overbidding in the fixed 
rate tenders no important market imperfections occurred around Eurosystem main refinancing operations 
executed from November 1999 to March 2000.  
 
4.3.2 Release of liquidity information on Reuters ECB40 
As pointed out most forcefully by Vergara (2000) and as described above in 2.2.1, an important event for 
money market traders under the fixed tender regime was the daily 9.15am ECB release of information on the 
money market liquidity situation for the previous day (aggregate reserve account holdings and recourse to 
standing facilities).
38 For both active and more passive money market traders this release provides a signal 
about the likely liquidity situation in the overnight market on the present day (particularly for the start of 
trading) and more generally in the remainder of the maintenance period. From this consideration one would 
expect the market to be relatively active around that particular time of the day, potentially with some 
volatility related to the time it takes that the new information is incorporated in market rates. 
 
This expectation seems to be borne out by our more frequent data from the MID. First, when looking at the 
intraday activity patterns, as displayed in Figure 5, the interval around 9.15am is on average the most active 
of the day in terms of trading volume and also very active in terms of quote revision frequency. When we 
look at the volatility measures in Tables 8, 10, 11 and 14, we also observe regularly some evidence of 
relatively large rate fluctuations either directly before or directly after the standard release time. The 
enhanced tick frequency or rate fluctuations seem to be somewhat further reinforced on days with special 
events (compared to “normal” days without special events), such as ECB Governing Council days (Table 8 
above), M3 release days (Table 10 above) and perhaps also MRO settlement days (Table 14 to come below) 
but not really on MRO auction days where only MID turnover tends to spike up (Table 11). Although the 
volatility and tick frequency reactions are not necessarily very large, we take these observation as a 
confirmation of the special importance of the 9.15 liquidity release for overnight market participants. 
 
4.3.3 The end of the minimum-reserve maintenance period 
Another feature of monetary operations and liquidity management is the minimum reserve regime for banks 
operating in the euro area. As described in 2.2.3 above, the requirement to hold on average a certain amount 
of reserves in Eurosystem accounts can mean that if there are unexpected liquidity shocks or banks’ 
planning was imperfect, then shortages or excesses of liquidity at the end of the maintenance period can lead 
to special behaviour of overnight rates during those days.  
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maintenance-period (EOM) days in Table 12, one observes immediately that on EOM days new quotes are 
posted much more frequently (about twice as often). However, MID trading volume remains on a rather 
“normal” level or somewhat below. Volatility of overnight rates appears clearly much larger on end-of-
maintenance period days than on “normal” days (usually even more than double), particularly in the 
afternoon (Table 12).
39 This reflects the “last-minute” attempts of banks to hit their target given by the 
reserve requirement. As can be seen from the troughs and peaks around the 23
rd of a month in Figure 4 
above, the volatility is either caused by an aggregate shortage of liquidity in the market at that time 
(overnight rate jumps up) or by an aggregate excess of liquidity (overnight rate slumps). It underlines the 
extreme trading needs by banks with reserve imbalances at this time and the high risks for liquidity 
managers already referred to before.  
 
[TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In line with the high uncertainty and inventory risk created by the overnight rate volatility described above, 
quoted spreads tend to widen systematically on EOM days (Table 12). Considering all “voice” brokers the 
market’s average spread reaches 7.7 basis points, compared to 5.6 basis points on “normal” days. For the 
MID the difference between the two is even larger (EOM days 7.5 basis points, normal days 2.7 basis 
points). Looking at intraday spreads for EOM days, for all brokers (except GREL, who appears to stop 
quoting) they are highest in the afternoon, pointing to the special uncertainties towards the end of trading 
during these days. For most brokers these higher spreads seem to be at least partly related to the higher 
volatility of interest rates at that time. Otherwise, the high afternoon spreads may simply reflect the fact that 
most market participants reached their reserve target and are therefore unwilling to trade, since a newly 
acquired imbalance would in all likelihood force them to borrow from the marginal lending facility (in the 
case of a liquidity shortfall) or to put excess balances in the deposit facility, both at penalty rates. 
 
4.3.4 Liquidity shocks from Treasury operations 
It is by now well known that operations by some euro area Treasuries with their national central banks can 
significantly change the liquidity situation in the money market and are therefore of special concern to 
central bank liquidity management (see e.g. Escrivá and Fagan, 1996; ECB, 1999b). Actually, they have 
been identified as the largest irregular “autonomous” liquidity shocks since the start of stage 3 of EMU 
                                                                                                                                                                               
38 ECB40 may have even become more important under the new variable rate tender regime, under which it also contains the ECB 
liquidity forecast and under which precision in the amounts bid is more important for banks. 
39 The 11 basis points average rate change in the MID during EOM mornings seems to be an exception. However, when we look at 
the higher frequency tick-to-tick standard deviation for the MID (and the “voice” brokers; reported in square brackets), then 
afternoon volatility is also highest in this system. We verified that the same results hold for the volatility of transaction prices. 
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40 Often they are triggered by tax payments in countries in which the central bank 
acts as the bank for the government. 
 
The first remark in relation to these shocks is a caveat for the analysis of EOM days undertaken above. 
Rather by coincidence a special large liquidity shock through tax payments and related Treasury operations 
occurs in Italy on the 23
rd of each month, exactly on the day at which the Eurosystem reserve maintenance 
period is ending. Behind this shock are tax payments to the Treasury, which deposits the money with the 
Banca d’Italia. During our sample period the size of these shocks varied, withdrawing each time between 12 
and 25 billion euro of liquidity – a considerable amount even for the large euro money market. This causes 
an identification problem, in so far as part of the enhanced quoting, volatility and transaction costs observed 
above may be a result of these shocks, hitting at the same time as banks have to meet their minimum reserve 
targets. For example, this feature may explain why the increase in bid-ask spreads is way more dramatic in 
the Italian MID system than suggested by the “voice” broker data for other countries. However, with the 
small number of Italian tax days in our sample there is no easy solution how to disentangle the relative 
importance of the end of the reserve maintenance period and the Italian tax day liquidity shocks, and we 
therefore leave it for future research. 
 
Instead we identified the remaining “normal” days in which aggregate government deposits with Eurosystem 
member central banks varied by more than two standard deviations from their mean absolute change over 
our sample period in order to compare overnight market behaviour on those days with non-Treasury 
operation days (excluding special days, such as Council or MRO days). Since only 4 such days could be 
identified, 3 of them exhibiting a withdrawal of liquidity from Treasury operations and 1 showing an 
increase in liquidity, we do not report the full results.
41 Keeping in mind the low number of observations, we 
note that the only special feature characterising those days was an increase in volatility for overnight rate 
quotes from all brokers, including the MID system. This is the result one would expect, if rates vary as a 
consequence of the change in liquidity demand or supply, until the imbalance is removed. 
 
4.4 Payment and settlement events 
 
The close link between payment and settlement system obligations and certain trading patterns is often 
overlooked in the financial market literature. In this sub-section we are going to address three issues 
regarding the link between euro overnight market trading and payment system events. First, we are studying 
                                                       
40 “Autonomous” shocks in the language of central bank liquidity management refer to shocks caused by factors that cannot be 
influenced directly by the central bank. Hamilton (1996) describes similarly important effects caused by Treasury operations in the 
US money market. Bindseil and Seitz (2001) show that changes in banknote demand can also cause sizeable “autonomous” shocks, 
but that they are much more regular, following a seasonal pattern that is relatively easy to predict. 
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question whether settlement transactions in relation to large expiring open market operations are causing 
repercussions in the overnight market. Finally, we identify the days of our sample in which some 
disturbance in TARGET or Euro1, the two main large-value payment systems in the euro area, occurred and 
study whether those caused significant repercussions in euro overnight market trading. 
 
4.4.1 Intraday timing 
As argued by Angelini (2000), in the case of the money market the second trading peak towards the close of 
the business day may reflect news about payment system obligations, arriving late in the afternoon, such as 
unforeseen out-payments. Angelini points out that for a risk-averse bank its specific intraday timing of 
trading should reflect the relative magnitude of the risks to be expected. Hence, a bank will trade relatively 
early to hedge against high interest rate risk expected in the afternoon. Conversely, it will preferably trade 
late in the day, if payment system shocks during the afternoon are expected to be more important. 
 
In this regard we find some signs of change in the functioning of Italian interbank deposit trading after the 
euro was introduced. As described by Angelini (2000, Figure 2), in the mid-1990s on normal days trading 
volume in the MID was highest in the afternoon, before the closing of the domestic net settlement system. 
However, due to the substantially higher interest rate risk on EOM days, the largest part of the trading 
shifted to the morning on those days. Our data show that between November 1999 and March 2000 MID 
market activity on normal days (as measured by quoting intensity and trading volume) was fairly balanced 
between the first and the second half of the trading day (Figure 5 and Table 4). For EOM days we find only 
a very moderate shift of trading volume from the afternoon to the morning, if any at all (Figure 6 and Table 
12). Notice that quoting frequency gives the opposite picture in this particular case, namely more numerous 
price updating in the afternoon than in the morning of EOM days. This is the source of the weakened link 
between quoting intensity and trading volume on those special days described above in 3.1. As this high 
quoting activity goes hand in hand with enhanced volatility (Table 12), a plausible explanation for this 
phenomenon is that the banks that still have reserve holdings above target try to keep the funds away from 
the market, testing whether they can “squeeze” the potentially few banks that still need liquidity to reach 
their target with high overnight rates.
42 Alternatively, in case of an aggregate excess of liquidity, the few 
banks that still want to buy liquidity may test actively very low rates. 
 
The changes in intraday timing for Italy have two possible explanations. First, as observed by Perez-Quiros 
and Rodriguez (2000), for example, EOM volatility is lower in the euro area than before. This reduces the 
                                                                                                                                                                               
41 Large negative liquidity shocks occurred on 5 November and 7 December 1999 and 24 January 2000 (the latter an Italian tax 
operation that did not fall on the 23
rd because of a weekend, whereas the maintenance period finished the Friday before the 
weekend), a large positive shock happened on 1 December 1999.  
42 See Nyborg and Strebulaev (2000) for an analysis of market squeezes in relation to auctions. 
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since EOM days fall now together with the Italian tax day on the 23
rd of each month (before EMU the end of 
the reserve maintenance period in Italy was on the 14
th of a month), the much enhanced liquidity risk when 
payment system balances become known in the afternoon provides an incentive for risk-averse banks to wait 
with their transactions until later in the day. Both arguments point in the direction of a more even 
distribution of trading between morning and afternoon on EOM days after the start of Monetary Union, 
which is what our data suggest. 
 
4.4.2 Main refinancing operation settlement days 
The weekly MROs lead to very large exchanges of liquidity against eligible assets between the central bank 
and the market. As described in 3.3, each transaction is normally settled on the Wednesday when the two-
week repo contract comes due. Table 13 compare ticks, volatility and spreads for these MRO settlement 
days with other “normal” days (excluding Council and MRO auction days).
43 The data indicate that quoting 
activity, volatility and spreads are hardly changed on MRO settlement days. However, the MID data suggest 
a massive increase in turnover. The refined picture of Table 14 indicates this tripling of turnover is 
distributed relatively evenly over the morning and the afternoon, and the changed volume pattern is in no 
way associated with any noteworthy changes in ticks, volatility or spreads. However, there is no guarantee 
that the turnover increase on settlement Wednesdays is generally equally large outside the MID system as 
well. Since the biggest euro money market traders are normally not active in the MID and since for them 
MRO settlement transactions are not larger than many other tickets they handle over the day, it cannot be 
taken for granted that their trading swells on those days in proportion to MID turnover. 
 
[TABLES 13 AND 14 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In sum, the available evidence suggests that the market deals with the extremely large trading requirements 
on MRO settlement days with ease and without any significant repercussions. One factor for this calm 
market may be the revolving nature of MROs, namely that the usual settlement Wednesday is preceded by a 
Tuesday MRO in which market participants can procure liquidity from the Eurosystem needed on the next 
day. Another one may be that for the larger players MRO settlement transactions are not of extraordinary 
size.  
 
4.4.3 Payment system disturbances 
If market participants become aware that a disturbance in a major payment system may prevent them from 
settling transactions with their counterparties, they may become reluctant to enter into new contracts. Hence, 
severe payment system problems might be associated with large bid-ask spreads and fading trading activity. 
                                                       
43 Following those criteria out of 20 settlement days happening during our sample period 15 entered the comparison.  
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MID volumes, volatility and spreads for the special payment system days described in sub-section 3.3 with 
those observed on “normal” days without late net settlement completion or problems.
44 Since there were few 
interesting features on those days and since any changes were relatively small, we do not report the results in 
detail, but rather give a brief summary of them. 
 
It turns out that the special payment system days identified tend to have slightly higher quoting activity for 
several brokers but not the MID, particularly in the afternoon, right before the systems close. Volatility does 
not seem to change, except perhaps in the MID where it is slightly up. Bid-ask spreads are slightly higher as 
well for a few brokers, in particular in the pre-closing afternoon period. However, MID trading volume was 
even higher than “normal”, particularly during the afternoon. In addition, we also scrutinised the only day 
when there was a problem affecting TARGET, the 1 December 1999. Our data did not show any special 
features on that day. In sum, the number of days with real payment system problems seems to have been 
extremely small during the five months examined. Moreover, effects of any payment system problems seem 
to have been rather contained, so that one cannot reject the hypothesis that the euro overnight market has 
been relatively resilient to such problems during our sample period. However, apart from the general caveat 
that the “voice” broker data may sometimes not give a very precise picture, this does not mean, of course, 
that if a very large and severe payment system crisis was to happen in the future the money market would 
necessarily remain unaffected by it. 
 
4.5 The year 2000 changeover week 
 
Finally, since our sample extends over the millennium change date, we want to briefly examine how the 
money market behaved from Christmas 1999 (25 December) to the start of 2000 (3 January). This year 2000 
(Y2K) changeover week was regarded as a particular risky episode for financial market participants, because 
information technology system failures could prevent banks from trading or settling their transactions in the 
payment system. Therefore, observers anticipated trading in the money and other financial markets to dry 
up.  
 
Table 15 displays ticks, MID volumes, volatility and spreads of the 5 Y2K changeover weekdays, so that 
they can be compared to those of “normal” days, as contained in Tables 4, 5 and 6. The first observation is 
that the days of the millennium date change were particularly inactive in terms of quoting for all “voice” 
brokers but not the MID. Then, our data show extremely high volatility during the Y2K changeover days 
(except for the UK-based broker Prebon Yamane, who virtually ceded quoting during this period). For 
                                                       
44 Using the criterion of late Euro1 end-of-day settlement completion and late TARGET closing described in sub-section 3.3, 19 
days in our sample were denoted as being special or having payment system problems. These 19 days also included the only 
TARGET problem on 1 December 1999. 
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the case at the special end-of-reserve maintenance period days. The huge spikes in Figure 4 above, almost 
hitting the marginal lending facility rate level for the MID series on 30 December 1999, illustrate the point. 
Quoted bid-ask spreads were also higher during the Y2K changeover week (except for the inactive French 
broker), in particular in the Italian MID, where they doubled. Interestingly, comparing these spreads to EOM 
spreads suggests that market participants may regard EOM days as slightly more illiquid or risky than the 
Y2K changeover days. However, in line with the hardly lower MID ticks MID turnovers were only 
moderately lower than on “normal” Mondays, Thursdays or Fridays.  
 
[TABLE 15 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In sum, the observations on ticks, volatility and spreads are consistent with the hypotheses that traders were 
more reluctant to enter transactions during the Y2K changeover days and therefore overnight market 
liquidity dried up, so that sometimes extreme volatility emerged. However, electronic trading in the Italian 





In this paper we started the empirical analysis of the euro money market’s microstructure. This market is 
particularly interesting, since it is one of the largest money markets in the world and since in its entirety it 
only exists since the introduction of the new transnational currency in January 1999. The paper begins with a 
description of the institutional environment of the euro money market, encompassing the central bank’s 
interest-rate setting bodies, the instruments for monetary policy operations, the private market financial 
instruments and trading mechanisms and the payment and settlement infrastructure for the transfer of funds. 
It then describes the data collected for this study, namely five months of intraday overnight rate quotes from 
5 euro area and one UK broker as well as from the Italian electronic trading system MID.  
 
A detailed analysis of these data show “two-hump” or “u”-shaped intraday patterns for quoting frequency 
and a little bit less pronounced for volatility (analogous, for example, to equity and bond markets), but a 
flatter, sometimes rather weakly (single) “hump”-shaped intraday pattern for bid-ask spreads. High spreads 
between 11am and 2pm may reflect the lower liquidity of the market around the lunch break (in particular 
when coupled with low turnover) and on certain days the arrival of important information during the midday 
period. Quoting activity, rate volatility and spreads are relatively high on days with ECB Governing Council 
meetings (usually Thursdays) compared to non-Council days in the euro overnight market, particularly 
during midday when the ECB’s interest rate decisions are released. These features reflect the risks for the 
market related to the arrival of important new information. However, overnight rate fluctuations after the 
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changes and there is no evidence that trading volume dries up before the release, which is both consistent 
with the absence of large asymmetric information and relatively precise rate expectations by the market. We 
also found that ECB releases of M3 figures, referring to the first pillar of the ECB’s monetary policy 
strategy, are preceded by a moderate increase in short-term volatility, but a very short slump in quoting 
activity in the half-hour before is not accompanied by a similar slump in trading volume, suggesting only a 
moderate degree of uncertainty. We were not able to identify any special overnight rate patterns either 
before or after ECB Monthly Bulletin releases. 
 
Tuesday’s Eurosystem main refinancing operations with the open market are associated with high MID 
trading volumes across the whole day, particularly right after the announcement of the allotment results. The 
latter reflects the post-operation liquidity re-allocation process, which however seems to cause some 
moderate volatility only for a very short period. Since in addition bid-ask spreads are not particularly high, 
neither before nor after the announcement of the auction results, one may conclude that – despite large 
overbidding in the fixed-rate tenders – the overnight market functioned fairly efficiently (without signs of 
adverse selection or market power) around Eurosystem open market operations. It is also shown that spreads 
and volatility tend to be very high at the end of the maintenance period for Eurosystem minimum reserve 
requirements, reflecting the high risks involved for banks when staying too long above or below their 
reserve targets. Finally, the largest irregular “autonomous” liquidity shocks for the euro money market, 
operations between national Treasuries and central banks, seem to cause some moderate high-frequency 
volatility in the overnight market until the imbalances are absorbed. 
 
Turning to the payment system results, most importantly we found that settlement days of Eurosystem main 
refinancing operations are characterised by very large market turnovers (at least for the Italian electronic 
trading system MID), which however the market seems to transact with ease and without any increases in 
transaction costs or volatility. We also argued that institutional changes of EMU led to a balancing of 
activity between the morning and afternoon trading in the Italian segment. Finally, payment system 
disturbances seem to have been extremely rare and benign, so that we could not detect any strong signs of 
difficulty in the overnight market related to the events identified for the two largest euro area payment 
systems. Last but not least, we illustrated how the Y2K changeover led to very large volatility and bid-ask 
spreads in the euro overnight market, although the MID did not experience substantial volume reductions 
during this relatively risky week. Perhaps with the exception of some episodes during the very special Y2K 
changeover week, overnight rate differentials between euro area countries seem extremely small, even 
intraday, reflecting the very high degree of integration of this market. 
 
The purpose of this paper has been to review a wide range of microstructure issues for the euro area 
overnight market related to the institutional environment of it and other money markets more generally. The 
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with the EMU. As illustrated by our analysis, remaining cross-country heterogeneities in terms of trading 
channels and practices do not lead to the emergence of any noticeable cross-border overnight rate 
differentials, thereby ensuring a single interest rate for the euro area at the short end of the yield curve. The 
breadth of the present analysis did not allow for going into greater depth on many of the important issues 
raised. For example, future research could focus on more elaborate analyses of the relationship between 
money market expectations and ECB Governing Council policy decisions as well as on the implications of 
changes in open market operation auction procedures for money market trading and efficiency.  
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